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THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: 
HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETIERS, AND JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS. By Max Lerner.t New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers. 1989. Pp. xlviii, 500. Paper, $21.95. 
HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES. By Sheldon M. Novick.2 Boston, Massa-
chusetts: Little, Brown and Company. 1989. Pp. xxi, 522. 
Cloth, $24.95. 
Robert F. Nage/3 
Max Lerner's classic book, reprinted with a new concluding 
essay, contains some commentary about Holmes's life, but it is 
mainly a collection of the judge's writings; Sheldon Novick's book 
contains many quotations from Holmes, but is chiefly a narrative 
biography. The two books usefully complement one another. To-
gether they provide an internal view of the man's thoughts and an 
external view of the events of his life. In their different ways, these 
are both admirable books, but even in combination they do not pre-
vent Holmes from eluding us. This is not a criticism, for it means 
only that the books are faithful to Holmes's mysterious character 
and intellect. Oliver Wendell Holmes continues to dominate our 
image of the American judge, not because his ideas are especially 
attractive today, but because his thought and life were so complex 
and rich. He was large enough to be emblematic of much of Ameri-
can history and virtually all of our legal traditions. 
Aside from his effort to describe and to make sense of Holmes's 
jurisprudence,4 Novick for the most part lets the daily events of life 
speak for themselves. He mentions the great philosophers Holmes 
read in much the same way that he identifies Holmes's dinner 
guests. If there are over-arching explanations or theories or themes 
in Honorable Justice, they remain largely implicit-subordinate to 
discrete and colorful accounts of war experiences, social life, hard 
work, stately summers in the country, an odd but touching mar-
riage, the massing of life in thousands of specifics and then its grad-
l. Newspaper columnist, author, and educator. 
2. Scholar-in-resident, Vermont Law School. 
3. Ira Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. 
4. Especially in his footnotes, Novick discusses various disputes about Holmes's juris-
prudence, including its relationship to utilitarianism (p. 432), the place of duty in his tort 
liability scheme (pp. 434-35), the constitutional principle behind his philosophy of deference 
(p. 444), the malice standard and judicial legislation (p. 447), and the extent to which 
Holmes's opinions were protective of freedom of speech (pp. 473-74). 
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ual falling away. The book does not provide a strong structure, but 
it does provide a believable, arresting description of Holmes's 
world. 
That world was, of course, vastly different from our own. 
Holmes was something close to the opposite of what Fred Siegel has 
termed the "bureaucratic individualist" -that egalitarian, un-
rooted, intellectual absolutist so common among the Vietnam War 
generation that now dominates much of the academic culture.5 
Judged against up-to-date standards, Holmes comes off (as Novick 
says in one of his few direct assessments) as "a violent, combative, 
womanizing aristocrat .... "6 
Lerner's collection of Holmes's writings, on the other hand, 
was first published in 1943, a time when much of the substance of 
those writings seemed less foreign and sinister than it does now. 
Although a few reviewers saw Holmes as an irrationalist and even a 
potential totalitarian7 and although Lerner himself was aware of the 
untamed aspects of Holmes's thought, The Mind and Faith of Jus-
tice Holmes conceives of Holmes essentially as a cultivated philoso-
pher, an aristocratic conservative whose dispassionate application 
of majoritarian principles upheld progressive legislation against 
constitutional attacks. 
The choice between the good and the bad Holmes may be par-
ticularly urgent today. For contemporary lawyers, still entranced 
by decades of congenial politics from the federal courts, but sud-
denly sobered by the prospect of a Rehnquist Court without Justice 
Brennan, Holmes is a rather frightening role model. His major her-
esy, an extreme belief in deference to the political branches, was 
once his major virtue. Indeed, Holmes said that if his fellow citi-
zens wanted "to go to hell," he would help them get there. This 
was, he explained, "my job."s (The mind boggles at the thought of 
a modem-day confirmation hearing.) For a generation that came to 
professional maturity defending court-ordered school busing, proce-
dural due process for school students, and the constitutional right 
to condoms, it is important that this Holmes remain beyond re-
demption. Yet as the Court moves to the right, liberal commenta-
tors may have as much cause to fear conservative activism as to 
5. Siegel, Is Archie Bunker Fit to Rule? Or: How Emmanuel Kant Became One of the 
Founding Fathers, 69 TELOS 9, 27 (1986). 
6. For an excellent discussion of Holmes from a contemporary perspective, see 
Luban, Justice Holmes and Judicial Virtue, in CHAPMAN & GAI.STON, NOMOS, Virtue 
(forthcoming). 
7. E.g., Lucey, Book Review, 32 GEO. L.J. 206 (1944); Ford, Book Review, 12 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 303 (1943). 
8. Letter of March 4, 1920 to Harold Laski, HOLMES-LASKI LEITERS 1916-1935 
(1953) at 248-49. 
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mourn the passing of liberal activism. If so, Holmes's majoritarian-
ism may become respectable again;9 if he seemed outmoded com-
pared to Brennan, he may seem wise compared to Scalia. 
While Novick's historical narrative provides much grist for 
those who want to see Holmes as a villain, it also helps in small but 
interesting ways to put his various heresies in perspective. Novick 
notes, for example, that Dred Scott v. Sandford was decided a day 
before Holmes's sixteenth birthday, leaving it to the reader to recog-
nize how closely this corresponds to the age many of our generation 
of lawyers had attained when Brown v. Board of Education was 
handed down. From Novick we learn how chivalric idealism and 
New England moralism were transformed in Holmes by the brutal 
realities of the Civil War. (Apparently, Holmes's mother was the 
strong abolitionist in the family and the one who pushed him to-
ward his grisly experiences as a soldier in the cause.) Novick re-
minds us how massively constitutional niceties were ignored during 
that war, but the teacher of expediency then was not Nixon but 
Lincoln. 
In Holmes's case, judicial restraint was only the jurisprudential 
surface of what are today deeper philosophical and political here-
sies. Holmes's writings, for example, reveal him to have been con-
tent, even pleased, with a vision of politics (and law, too) as a 
contest where self-interest is natural and power the ultimate guide. 
He pronounced himself to be behind his country "right or wrong," 
and he thought the world needed more widespread obedience to 
government. He believed that the state must sacrifice individuals to 
the general good, and, therefore, he approved of compulsory sterili-
zation of the retarded and detention without probable cause during 
civil unrest. He declared that he had "no sympathy at all" for 
equality. And about "this squashy sentimentality ... of pacifists-
of people who believe there is an onward and upward-who talk of 
uplift," Holmes said, "Oh bring in a basin." All the while, he in-
sisted that he doubted his own beliefs. 
These are not the views of a properly sensitive modern intellec-
9. In the 1989 edition, Lerner adds an "afterword essay" that suggests one direction 
such a revival might take. While reasserting the democratic value of judicial deference, Ler-
ner adds that "Holmes never turned his doctrine rigid, never carried it into historical excur-
sions in search of 'original intent,' never read the Constitution with a literalism that would 
leach out its meaning .... " Thus he sets the stage for a possible middle-way that would 
"give judges a direction for meeting the strong social urgencies of the time, and for adding a 
measure of statesmanship to the Holmes legacy of judicial deference." And, indeed, a modi-
fied emphasis on deference may well be making a comeback. See, e.g., Sunstein, The Future 
of Constitutional Politics, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 51, Spring 1990. For other straws in 
the wind, see West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641 
(1990); Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REv. 99 (1990). 
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tual, but Novick's history reminds us how different Holmes's cir-
cumstances were. The Civil War, unlike the Vietnam War, was 
plainly and intensely a conflict of regional and cultural interests. 
Fastidious reservations about the central importance of naked pref-
erences would have been surreal to a man who had seen many die in 
such a war and who had himself felt so keenly the desire for self-
preservation. Indeed, when the clash of interests appeared in the 
infinitely more civilized forms of legislation and litigation, the battle 
would naturally have seemed benign rather than problematic. 
Moreover, according to Novick, Holmes was rooted not only in the 
destruction and danger of his war experiences but also in the seren-
ity and provincial sophistication of nineteenth century Boston. 
When Holmes first went into battle, he took along his personal ser-
vant. His world was both comfortable and small. He grew up near 
the Cabots and the Lodges, near Henry Melville and Nathaniel 
Hawthorne and Ralph Waldo Emerson ("Uncle Waldo" to young 
Holmes). Criss-crossing the Atlantic in his middle years, he would 
run into William James and others from his social set; Henry Cabot 
Lodge proposed Holmes to Theodore Roosevelt for the Court, and 
when Holmes moved to Washington at sixty years of age, he dined 
regularly with the President (for a while). 
Novick recounts how, as society churned with labor unrest in 
1892, the aristocratic Holmes visited a local labor leader whom he 
had never met. Novick quotes Holmes's explanation: 
I made a pilgrimage to his very humble shrine & bid him sit & deliver his senti· 
ments .... "Sir," I said, "I am Judge H. of the Supreme Judicial Court-I have no 
ulterior motives & no particular questions to ask ... but I thought in the recently 
published interviews you talked like a man of more sense than the rest & as a judge 
& as a good citizen I like to understand all phases of economic opinion-what 
would you like if you could have it?" 
This charming incident may seem to reinforce Lerner's conception 
of Holmes as the patrician democrat and civil libertarian. But 
Novick's careful eye catches in small facts some of what lay behind 
such pleasing pictures. In another revealing episode, for instance, 
when the great Justice finally retired from the Court, the parlor 
maid "came into the room weeping, and knelt at Holmes's feet 
.... " He was a man securely anchored on the high ground who 
could afford to believe that in unknowable ways the rough world 
was working itself into better shape, who could afford the great lux-
uries of skepticism and self-doubt and open-mindedness. 
There is, in short, not much reason to try to choose between 
Lerner's Holmes and Novick's. Holmes's words and his life both 
point to the conclusion that the unparalleled American fascination 
with this judge is traceable to his complexity. He is so large a figure 
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that he can be used for just about any purpose and, more impor-
tantly, he is large enough to be evocative-even representative--of 
a national identity. 
Holmes's life straddled the two centuries of our national exist-
ence. When he was a boy in Boston during the 1840s and 1850s, 
Novick tells us he fished in the Back Bay, and, "The air was fresh 
and smelled of the sea." 
Indoors, in the winter evenings, there were candles, warm firelight, and whale oil 
lamps that were lighted by holding a glowing coal against the wick ... The furniture 
was stately, solid, and expensive. 
By the time he was nearing the end of his life, World War I was 
over, the Court faced the issue of wiretapping, and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was President. The particulars of Holmes's life continu-
ally bridged this chasm between nostalgic, stable innocence and for-
bidding, disintegrative modernism. He spent polite summers 
socializing on English estates and pleasant country evenings in car-
riage rides with his wife. At first viewing war as a gentleman's obli-
gation, he was wounded several times and eventually saw the Civil 
War as intensely frightening and profoundly incomprehensible. He 
read Darwin and Hegel, approved of euthanasia, and eventually 
wrote serenely about the possibility of a proletarian dictatorship in 
the United States. 
Especially in law, Holmes seems to represent everything Amer-
ican, embodying at once both the past and the future. He was the 
detached, impersonal legalist who could rise above class and per-
sonal preferences to apply principle. But he wrote his opinions in a 
highly personal style (the pronoun "I" was everywhere) with un-
constrained assessments often bluntly at the core of his judgments.w 
He was the particularist, the rigorous common law judge, the neme-
sis of formality and doctrine. But he had little interest in facts, and 
his maxims and common law principles verged on being simplistic 
formulae.tt Holmes was a plain-meaning textualist, but, conceiving 
of law as being embedded in tradition and behavior and interests, 
10. Consider, for example, Holmes on the legality of wire-tapping: 
. . . I think. . . apart from the Constitution the government ought not to use evi-
dence obtained ... by a criminal act. There is no body of precedents by which we 
are bound, and which confines us to logical deduction from established rules. 
Therefore, we must consider the two objects of desire both of which we cannot have 
and make up our minds which to choose. . . . [F]or my part I think it a less evil that 
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. 
Lerner, pp. 361-62. 
II. He did not care, for instance, what the legislators' motives actually were (Lerner, p. 
253-54) or what specific justifications might exist for a statute (Lerner, pp. 256-59). He estab-
lished a simplistic standard of care for railroad-crossing cases (pp. 207-08), and his clear and 
present danger "test" (p. 324) was in form and fact a precursor to elaborate modem doctrine. 
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he would disregard both intent and literal meaning. 12 He was a 
deferential majoritarian. But he was scornful of the people's wis-
dom and on occasion would thwart the popular will on the basis of 
his own superior moral sensibility.l3 He was a cautious, high-
minded civil libertarian. But some of his constitutional judgments, 
rendered with supreme self-assurance, had vast, almost totalitarian 
implications.l4 
Holmes's jurisprudence was romantic, literary, and communi-
tarian. It was also scientific, rationalistic, and individualistic. He 
claimed only to be a lawyer, and he was the contemporary of James 
Thayer, John Chapman Gray, and Christopher Langdell; but he 
tried to be a poet, philosopher, and economist, and his writing 
presages the work of James B. White, Ronald Dworkin, and Rich-
ard Posner.1s He could be reassuring and commonsensical; he 
could be destabilizing and highfalutin. He was a practitioner and 
an academic, an aristocrat and a democrat. He was a highly culti-
vated man who wrote gracefully about primitive instincts. He was a 
pragmatic realist who was skeptical of reform. No one took law 
more seriously, but no one came closer to merging law with policy, 
power, and personal choice. 
So, like American law itself, we can make of Holmes what we 
will. To me, at least, the important question is not which Holmes is 
the real one, but which contradiction is the most instructive. From 
reading these two books, my choice is this: Holmes's ego was enor-
mous, but he saw himself as peripheral and miniscule in the vast 
scale of human and cosmic events.l6 This paradox lay behind both 
his deference and his tolerance; it also lay behind what those doc-
12. Holmes often said that legal provisions should be read according to their "obvious" 
meaning (Lerner, pp. 192, 223, 332), but he also thought that text must be understood "in the 
light of our whole experience ... " (pp. 44-47, 277). 
13. See, e.g., note 10, supra. 
14. The most famous instance, of course, is Holmes's suggestion that the "only meaning 
of free speech" is that a proletarian dictatorship be established if "the dominant forces of the 
community" so desire (Lerner, p. 325). Other disquieting examples include his opinions on 
peonage (p. 336), sterilization (p. 356), and martial law (p. 268). 
15. Holmes, like White, had an elevated and romantic view of the legal profession: 
"And what a profession it is!. .. [W]hat other [calling] gives such scope to realize the sponta-
neous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life ... ? 
(Lerner, p. 29)." As is well known, his literary powers, as applied in judicial opinions, were 
truly remarkable. Moreover, Holmes's claims about the place of theory and philowphy in 
law-the working of cultural patterns into consciously understood and more coherent forms 
(pp. 53, 57, 88)--bear an uncanny resemblance to much of Dworkin's thought. His economic 
analysis was more rudimentary than Posner's but equally explicit (pp. 239-46). 
16. He had contempt for reformers who "criticiz[e] the order of the universe as if they 
were little gods outside it" (Lerner, p. 400). He wrote that "the universe has in it more than 
we understand," that "we want to live, some at least, because we want to realize our sponta-
neity and prove our powers, for the joy of it, and we may leave to the unknown the supposed 
final valuation of that which in any event has value to us." (p. 398). 
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trines rested on-his fatalism, his vitality, his curiosity, his security. 
He could delight in trying to understand while acknowledging his 
profound uncertainty; he could struggle to contribute while admit-
ting that he was not in control. He knew enough to know how 
limited he was, and in this he seems to me to have surpassed the 
American legal heritage that he personifies. 
STATE AND SALVATION: THE JEHOVAH'S WIT-
NESSES AND THEIR FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS. By 
William Kaplan. 1 Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto 
Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 340. Cloth, $35.00. 
Richard E Morgan 2 
William Kaplan has written a valuable book, which is far more 
than a study of the Canadian response to the practices of the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses. State and Salvation is an excellent brief history of 
the protection of civil liberties in modern Canada. It should be re-
quired reading for anyone seeking to understand the torturous pro-
gress of Canada toward a written bill of rights or the agonizing 
difficulties of integrating Quebec into the Canadian constitutional 
order. 
But Kaplan's principal subject is the treatment of a disagreea-
ble religious minority within Canada in the 1930s and 1940s, and 
the significance of this experience for the development of Canadian 
constitutionalism. South of the border, of course, we went through 
a roughly parallel experience with the same sect. Canadians, seized 
by the same animosities, annoyances, and patriotic enthusiasms as 
animated their brothers to the south in the same period, engaged in 
actual acts of suppression directed against the Witnesses. These 
were initially carried out in Quebec under that province's "Padlock 
Act" which provided for the closing down for twelve months of any 
building used for "the composition or dissemination of communist 
or Bolshevist propaganda." Later the federal War Measures Act, 
and the Defense of Canada Regulations adopted pursuant to it, re-
sulted in a "ban" on the Jehovah's Witnesses. In fact, the Witnesses 
remained largely free to proselytize. But certain of their properties 
were "padlocked" and in some cases children were placed under 
state supervision or excluded from school for refusal to sing the na-
tional anthem and perform other "patriotic duties." Pressure from 
I. Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. 
2. Professor of Government, Bowdoin College. 
